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Chapter 7
The Role of Guidance in the Annuity
Decision-Making Process
Kelli Hueler and Anna Rappaport
Some of the most important decisions that employees and retirees ever
make pertain to evaluating lifetime income streams and deciding how to
draw down their retirement incomes. Yet because these decisions involve
complex trade-offs that are often poorly understood, most people would
benefit from guidance. This chapter reviews the roles of plan sponsors,
plan administrators, advice providers, and public policy surrounding the
decision to buy annuities as payout vehicles providing lifelong income. We
examine how these roles can be handled using an institutional platform
offering structural and active guidance in the purchasing process. This
system requires informing individuals about available options, designing
websites for presenting information and education, and purchasing
through a competitive bidding process. Active guidance involves informa-
tion provided by salaried professionals who answer questions and have
conversations with individuals about the annuity purchase process. We
draw for our analysis on the experiences of Income Solutions®, Hueler
Companies’ institutional purchasing platform in the United States (Hue-
ler, 2012). We also draw lessons from experiences in Chile and the United
Kingdom.
Setting the stage
In the past, employees in the United States tended not to receive much
guidance about how to handle their retirement assets. If advice was offered,
it was normally relegated to at or near retirement, and rarely did employers
offer advice about annuitization, or the conversion of retirement assets into
a lifetime income stream. Now that defined contribution (DC) plans are
more common, most (except for money purchase pension plans) tend not
to offer annuity payouts, and if annuities are not offered through the plan,
retirees traditionally have gone to the retail market to purchase annuities. Yet
annuities can also be offered through an institutional purchasing platform
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 17/9/2013, SPi
(discussed in more detail below) that can bring the benefits of group
purchasing to individual retirees.
If people do not annuitize, they may take a structured or phased with-
drawal from their investment portfolios, and then they have no lifetime
protection against running out of money. Some favor the ‘4 percent rule,’
where the retiree can spend 4 percent of the initial asset balance annually,
perhaps with the withdrawal amount increased by inflation each year. Many
financial advisors and advice providers,1 particularly those who offer man-
aged accounts, tend to favor such a structured withdrawal approach over
the use of lifetime income annuities during the paydown phase. This bias
exposes the retiree to both investment and mortality risk. Some advice
providers have begun promoting late-in-life deferred annuities that begin
payments at ages 80 to 85 to address longevity risk, but they still discourage
the use of lifetime income annuities earlier in the drawdown phase.
US policy toward retirement payouts has been of two minds, in that some
efforts have promoted annuitization, while others discouraged it. For
instance, social security benefits are an inflation-indexed lifetime income
stream, and defined benefit (DB) pensions also traditionally provided
lifetime income. By contrast, funds in Individual Retirement Accounts
(IRAs) or DC plans other than money purchase plans are generally not
annuitized (Rappaport, 2011). As shown by Turner and Muir (2013), the
time of rollover is one of several situations when 401(k) plans are vulner-
able with regard to potential conflicts of interest. There is also no require-
ment to provide employees or retirees with information on payout
strategies or options beyond what is provided by the plan, and there is
also no requirement to provide information about the possibility of lifetime
income while plan assets are being accumulated. Some legislators have
recommended including illustrations of lifetime income streams as well
as account balances in the DC accounts, but this practice has not been
widely adopted (United States Senate, 2011).
The US Internal Revenue Code allows contributions to and investment
earnings in employer-sponsored pensions to benefit from tax deferral,
until the age of 70 and a half. Thereafter, the Required Minimum Distribu-
tions (RMD) rule requires that people withdraw at least a minimum
amount from their tax-deferred accounts each year, in order to limit tax
deferral. This minimum is calculated to spread withdrawals over the
retiree’s life expectancy, and the withdrawal fraction is recalculated each
year. Because the RMD provides for gradual withdrawals, it takes the focus
away from annuitization and other income options for people who do not
need to withdraw more from their qualified funds. For this reason, it has
come to be viewed as a recommendation or guidance offered by policy-
makers on about how to spend one’s funds. One problem is that an
individual who takes the RMD each year will have continued growth in
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funds when investment returns are high, but will deplete his assets too
rapidly when markets are low. As a consequence, the individual could run
out of money too soon.
It has also been difficult for pension plan sponsors to offer annuity
options, since regulations often impose barriers and create legal risks (Iwry
and Turner, 2009). Proposed regulations and two revenue rulings issued in
2012 by the United States Treasury Department sought to remove some of
the barriers and make it easier to offer lifetime income options to partici-
pants in certain instances. The new proposals sought to (a) move away from
the idea that choice of distribution option in employer-sponsored DB and
DC plans must be an all-or-nothing decision; (b) remove the barriers to the
use of advanced life deferred annuities that arise from the structure of the
RMD requirements;2 (c) clarify that DC sponsors who also have DB plans
may permit participants access to lifetime income through rollover of DC
funds into DB plans;3 and (d) make it easier for DC plan sponsors to include
deferred annuity options as plan investments prior to retirement (United
States Department of the Treasury, 2012). There has also been US Depart-
ment of Labor regulation requiring the disclosure and explanation of all DC
plan fees. These changes are signaling to plan sponsors and the broader
population how important it is to have lifetime income and transparency
(Council of Economic Advisers, 2012). These developments reflect new
support for lifetime income plans using qualified retirement plan assets.
Even if these initiatives are positive, the state of the regulatory environ-
ment remains complex. US employer-sponsored retirement programs are
regulated by the Federal government, while insurance contracts are regu-
lated by separate state insurance departments. Moreover, the annuity sales
process includes a requirement for a suitability review when individual
annuity contracts are sold, and the standards are evolving. In 2010, the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) adopted the
‘Suitability in Annuity Transactions’ model regulation seeking to set up a
regulatory framework holding insurers responsible for ensuring that annu-
ity transactions are suitable. This approach also required training for
agents, and where feasible, coordinated standards with requirements of
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA; see NAIC, 2010). Some
might see this suitability review process as a form of guidance.
Guidance and the annuitization decision
In the United States, pension participants receive signals on strategies for asset
drawdowns from many sources. Information can be provided by the plan
sponsor, the plan’s architecture, the media, an advisor or financial services
firm, guidance during the annuity purchase process, and government via
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 17/9/2013, SPi
The Role of Guidance in the Annuity Decision-Making Process 127
policy and regulation. As discussed below, such guidance can either sup-
port or discourage annuitization.
US DB plans must offer annuities as the default distribution option, so
here plan architecture imparts strong signals about the importance of
lifetime income. By contrast, most DC plans pay out lump sums that
are often rolled over to an IRA. Currently, only about one-fifth of DC
plans offer in-plan annuity options, and these are rarely utilized even
when offered (Wray, 2008).4 The 2012 Treasury releases may change how
DC balances are used, inasmuch as these assets now may be rolled over to
DB plans to provide lifetime income. A complementary model to this idea
is to offer participants who roll their funds to an IRA access to a favorable
purchasing program for annuities as part of the employer-sponsored pro-
gram design. At least one large plan is currently offering such an approach,
giving participants the alternative of moving DC funds to DB and the
choice of using DC funds to find the best customized arrangement from
the private market. Structural guidance in this case would include basic
education about lifetime income, information about specific annuity
options provided, and the pros and cons of each option.
Another example of plan architecture that highlights lifetime income
offers workers an option to buy lifetime income on a deferred basis, as one
of the plan’s investment options. Several insurance companies offer prod-
ucts to support such options, some using a fixed annuity, and some using a
variable annuity. The variable annuity options guarantee floor benefits and
offer upside potential through the use of a guaranteed minimum income
benefit or a guaranteed minimum withdrawal benefit. The options have
important differences with regard to portability and guaranteed provisions.
With these options, plan assets are invested during the working years in a
fund that offers lifetime income in retirement (Institutional Retirement
Income Council, 2011). These models blend features of traditional group
deferred annuity products with newer investment structures. Under these
models, the individual has no choice of insurance company and is limited
to the choice of payment forms embedded in the plan architecture. As yet,
the modern versions of this model have been adopted by few employers so
it remains to be seen how effective they will be.
To date, the role of the employer in supporting and encouraging the use
of lifetime income alternatives has been limited. Some plans have begun to
offer education around lifetime income and access to institutionally priced
annuities. As shown in Table 7.1, according to a Plan Sponsor Council of
America survey, about one-third of employers provide access to an
employer-selected financial planner or offer a seminar regarding retire-
ment assets and income planning (Wray, 2008). Nevertheless, it is not
known whether much information about annuities is provided, or whether
the messages favor or discourage consideration of annuitization. Moreover,
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the choice of options to be presented and how they are positioned may
be impacted by the products and services offered by the firm conducting
the seminar, as well as the compensation model. Of survey respondents, 5
percent indicated that they actively encouraged retirees to leave their
accumulations in the plan, 11 percent required or encouraged withdrawal,
and the remaining 84 percent were ambivalent (Wray, 2008).
When they do not offer access to annuities directly through the plans,
some employers do provide access to institutionally priced annuities
through a purchasing platform such as Income Solutions®. This platform
is most often utilized as an IRA rollover alternative. In such cases, structural
guidance varies widely: some regularly mention the availability of the
annuity purchasing option, while others provide little or no information
about the program. In addition, some employers make the program visibly
prominent at the benefits portal and facilitate easy access, while others bury
the offering in the benefits website, making it difficult to locate and access.
In our experience, the employer representative (either in-house or at the
record keeper) is the first point of contact regarding information at the
time of retirement plan distributions. How the process of such participant
communication is designed has a potent impact on what alternatives
retirees elect to explore. Very few employers offer education emphasizing
the importance of lifetime income and the value of annuitization, though
if, over time, a plan sponsor does explain such benefits in newsletters or
employee publications, this drives an increase in annuity quotations,
inquiries, and ultimately purchase activity. In other words, such an
approach can take several years to take hold, but it does produce increased
activity with time. On the other hand, experience across multiple program
partners suggests that even when a plan sponsor encourages consideration
of annuities, the primary driver behind purchasing behavior is whether the
benefits representative is objective and knowledgeable about retirement
distribution options. If the benefits representative dissuades participants
Table 7.1 Types of retirement guidance or education provided by companies to
their employees
Percentage Type of education
11 None, except notices required by law
34 Access to an employer-selected financial advisor
78 Provides educational materials explaining plan options
68 Offers retirement income calculator online
31 Offers seminar regarding retirement assets and income planning
Source: Derived from Wray (2008) using a 2008 survey of Profit Sharing Council of America
(now Plan Sponsor Council of America) members.
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from utilizing the competitive platform, or annuitizing a portion of their
balances, or steers the participant to a proprietary higher cost alternative,
this can trump employer efforts.
Many employers today offer advice to their DC plan participants; in fact,
a recent survey indicated that 79 percent of plan providers offered their
employees some type of investment advice (Callan Investment Institute,
2012). An advice provider may be an independent third party or affiliated
with the plan administrator, and such advisors generally seek to help
employees save more and make better investment decisions. Since plans
differ with regard to whether they encourage or permit leaving funds in
the plan post-retirement, and what options they offer, naturally the advice
providers will also differ as to whether they supply information and
advice for the payout period, what advice they provide, and how they help
people transition to the payout period. In our experience, some advice
providers do discuss a wide array of post-retirement options including annui-
tization and explain the options well, but others clearly discourage annuitiza-
tion as part of a drawdown strategy and instead seek to keep the funds in a
managed account using a structured payout or systematic withdrawal method.
This is important since the conversations taking place around retirement are
likely to have a major impact on retirees’ distribution strategies.
Employers also build expectations about the importance (or lack
thereof) of retirement income by how they depict retirement plan account
values during the working years. Some show only the account balances,
whereas others include retirement income projections.5 Callan Investment
Institute (2012) recently indicated that 58 percent of employers offered or
provided retirement income projections for participants; of these, 31 per-
cent showed them on the employee statements, 13 percent provided the
information through a separate mailed statement, 74 percent provided
access to a calculator on the benefits website, and 15 percent provided
the projection through a third party advice provider. More research is
required to better understand the range of practice in such statements
and projections, and their impacts on later decisions about lifetime income
and structured payouts.
An institutional purchasing platform and guidance
Plan sponsors can elect to offer an institutional purchasing program for
lifetime incomes, via an Internet-based competitive bidding platform for
immediate and deferred income annuities. This platform has two primary
modes for implementation: as a distribution option within the plan, or as
an IRA rollover alternative. To date, the most common method—with over
90 percent of programs implemented—is the IRA rollover alternative. The
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platform relies on participating insurance companies’ willingness to offer
annuities through a low-cost competitive distribution channel.
Within the various program partner offerings, the individual purchaser
may learn about annuities through general financial education, basic
annuity education provided on the website, employer-provided informa-
tion about the programs, or through facilitators or advisors. The system
architecture offers structural online guidance and information to support a
self-service model, including general annuity education, educational videos
discussing the importance of inflation-adjusted annuitization, tools for
calculating gaps between other sources of income and regular expend-
itures to establish income levels needed, standardized competitive annuity
quotes across multiple issuers, and information about the financial status
of the participating insurance companies. The structural guidance does
not recommend whether to buy an annuity or how much to buy; instead
the program is designed to educate individuals about annuity options,
lower costs, standardize fees, create transparency, and produce the best
possible market result for each individual. There is no incentive to use one
annuity provider versus another, or to constrain individual purchase
decisions.
Access to program and guidance models
Access to the platform occurs mainly through a retirement plan sponsor, a
program partner such as a financial services firm, a record keeper, an
association, or through an advisor linked to the program. The partner
plays a critical role in setting the stage for consideration of lifetime income
alternatives (or, as noted above, in effectively foreclosing such options).
Programs that offer a menu of alternatives and integrate annuitization into
the discussion not just for those on the verge of retirement but also after
retirement show the highest level of annuity purchase activity. By contrast,
if a program presents onerous disclaimers and/or uses an advice provider
who discourages annuitization in the drawdown phase this creates the
highest user drop-off rate.
The platform also provides individuals with access to active personal
guidance. This can range from basic assistance to more in-depth advice,
depending on the program partner. Currently, most programs do not offer
comprehensive financial planning or advice; rather, active guidance is
delivered through licensed salaried professionals able to talk with individ-
uals about options accessible through their employers, and/or additional
lifetime income alternatives available to them through their personal IRA.
Table 7.2 shows how the delivery of guidance differs across the program
models. Three models of guidance are available.
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Table 7.2 Comparison of structural and active guidance in institutional platform
delivery models through different channels
Element of
purchase process
Institutional
individual
Institutional
facilitator
Institutional
advisor
Structural guidance
Information
provided about
program
availability
Program partner Program partner Advisor
Who secures quote Individual Facilitator or
individual
Advisor
Who executes
purchase
Individual Facilitator or
individual
Advisor
How platform
impacts decision
to annuitize
Provides information
about value of annuity
and considerations—
text and video on
website
Facilitator may add to
what is on website, but
limits discussion to
pros, cons, and issues
vs. recommendations
Depends on how
it is used by
advisor
Issues to be
considered and
pros/cons
provided
By website Additional
information may be
provided by facilitator;
depends on program
partner
Depends on
advisor
Tools provided Yes, competitive quote,
insurance company
ratings, tool to
calculate income gap
Yes, how much
additional beyond
program platform
depends on program
partner
Advisor may
provide evaluation
or offer tools
beyond program
platform
Universe of
insurance carriers
providing annuity
quotesa
Platform does this
automatically
Platform does this
automatically
Platform does this
automatically
Can individual
access website
directly
Yes Yes No
Active guidance
Who answers
individual
questions
Help center or staff Facilitator Advisor
Recommendations
provided
No No Yes
a Participating insurance carriers may vary depending on program partner, annuity type, and
employee demographics such as state of residence.
Source: Authors’ analysis; see text.
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Online direct to individual
Here access is by the individual who initiates the quote and purchase
process through an online platform. This program includes structural
guidance with general information about immediate annuities, an explan-
ation of the benefits of institutional purchasing, a calculator to help the
individual estimate the gap between existing income and expenses, and a
place for requesting annuity quotes online. Individuals can telephone the
help center with questions and are provided basic assistance. Callers are
provided with active guidance in the form of assistance to help them use
the online platform and answers to questions regarding annuity termin-
ology, features, and the purchase process.
Facilitated
Here active guidance is provided through partnerships offering additional
professional assistance through a facilitator: salaried and licensedprofession-
als help participants submit requests for quotations, consider the purchase,
answer questions, and submit purchase requests through the platform. Such
facilitators may communicate with individual buyers by telephone or e-mail;
they are typically employees of the program partner who specialize in annu-
ities and income alternatives for retirement. In some transactions, the facili-
tator does all of these steps, while in others, the participant secures quotes or
places transactions, while the facilitator provides some assistance. The system
has an interactive design so that facilitators and individuals can both review
annuity quotes at the same time.
Advisor
Here the advisor provides broader financial advice, including advice about
the individual’s overall portfolio; in this case, the expert would initiate the
discussion. Advisors using this program are normally fee-based advisors
paid by the client; their job is to secure quotations, explain the options to
the client, advise them regarding the best annuity option, and in some
cases make the annuity placements.6
Table 7.3 compares the guidance models with individual purchase and
DB plan elections. Here we see that DB plan elections have a fixed period
when the election must be made; all the other purchase models allow
flexibility with regard to when the annuity purchase can take place and
features that can be selected. These models differ with regard to how the
contact is initiated, the options available, the timing, and the type of
guidance that is offered. The three models in the institutional purchase
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platform are similar except for the content and method of active guidance
and the method of initiation of the discussion.
Table 7.4 shows how the annuity purchases differ depending on the deliv-
ery channel used. It must be noted that the groups purchasing through
different channels are not necessarily similar demographically or by wealth
levels; we do not yet know the reasons for the observed differences by
channel. Individuals purchasing directly via the online platform have the
highest average premium, are heavily male, and are most likely to select a
joint life annuity; they also consider the purchase for quite a while and
request multiple quotes. Those purchasing through facilitators tend to have
several conversations before securing quotations, suggesting consideration of
needs prior to obtaining quotes. Our analysis of purchases where active
guidance was available showed an average of five calls per purchaser (and a
Table 7.3 Obtaining annuity income through retail purchase, institutional
purchase, and/or DB payout
Characteristic Retaila Institutional
individualb
Institutional
facilitatorc
Institutional
advisord
Annuity as a
DB payout
Contact re-
purchase of
annuity
Agent Self Facilitator, seen
as affiliated with
plan and hired by
program partner
Advisor, hired
by buyer
Plan sponsor
or
administrator
Pricing Retail Institutional Institutional Institutional Defined in
plan
Competitive
quotes
Maybe Yes Yes Yes NA
Fee disclosure Maybe Yes Yes Yes NA
Fee level Retail Institutional Institutional Institutional NA
Timing
constraints
No No No No Yes
Initial
communication
Usually
agent
Plan or
program
partner
Plan or program
partner
Advisor Plan sponsor
Initiator of first
step
Usually
agent
Self or help
center staff
Self or program
partner
Advisor Plan sponsor
must follow
plan
a Applies to purchase by the individual in the retail insurance market, usually using an agent.
b Applies to purchase through the institutional purchasing platform, where the individual
directly uses the platform after an introduction by the program partner.
c Applies to institutional purchasing platform where a facilitator, or salaried representative of a
program partner, assists in the purchase and secures quotations, answers questions, and
executes the purchase.
d Applies to situations where an advisor initiates the contact and executes on behalf of their
client.
Source: Authors’ analysis; see text.
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maximum of fourteen). Those purchasing through advisors had the lowest
premium per single purchase and a greater number of individual purchases,
perhaps reflecting the positioning of the annuity in their portfolios. Advisors
and their clients are more likely to view the purchase as part of a longer-term
lifetime income planning process, whereas a facilitator tends to act as a
specialist dealing with the client specifically on the annuity decision.
Structural guidance and decision-making
Individual purchasers of annuities have many choices to make, including
when to buy, how much to buy, whether to make multiple purchases, which
carrier(s) to choose, and what forms of annuity to take. Accordingly, the
competitive quotes provided on the platform include multiple carriers, the
form of annuity requested as well as alternatives, and the financial rating
information of all the insurance carriers. All quotes are standardized to
allow for straightforward comparability. Nearly all purchasers choose to get
multiple quotes before completing a purchase. Four is a typical number of
quotes for those making a single purchase, but ten is a typical number for
people making multiple purchases. Some of the variations that can be
tested using multiple quotes include single versus joint life, joint life
switching which spouse is primary, joint life with different percentages to
the survivor, premium amounts, and the date when the annuity income will
Table 7.4 Characteristics of annuity purchasers and what they purchased through
different channels
Total across all
channels
Institutional
individual
Institutional
facilitator
Institutional
advisor
Average amount of
premium
$139,000 $158,000 $142,000 $50,000
Female (%) 37 25 40 49
Male (%) 63 75 60 51
Joint life (%) 37 47 31 53
Single life (%) 50 40 55 46
Fixed period only (%) 13 13 14 1
Buying within two
weeks of first quote (%)
63 50 70 53
Buying within four
weeks (%)
78 67 83 69
Buying within six
months (%)
94 90 98 81
Buying after six
months (%)
6 10 2 19
Source: Authors’ analysis of data provided by the Hueler Companies.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 17/9/2013, SPi
The Role of Guidance in the Annuity Decision-Making Process 135
commence. Pricing is provided in real time. The competitive quote process
is designed to be transparent and it includes comparable product features
from different carriers and parallel information, offering a form of struc-
tural guidance. By including not only the income that can be provided but
also the financial rating of the carriers, the approach highlights the import-
ance of the insurance company’s financial status.
Suitability reviews and guidance
As part of the purchase of an immediate annuity contract, the purchaser
must complete a suitability form. While the specific forms may differ by
insurer, data required include information to determine suitability.
According to the NAIC: ‘“Suitability information” means information
that is reasonably appropriate to determine the suitability of a recommen-
dation, including age, annual income, financial situation and needs, finan-
cial experience and objectives, intended use of the annuity, financial time
horizon, existing assets, liquidity needs and net worth, risk tolerance and
tax status’ (NAIC, 2010: 4). While this process is designed to provide
consumer protection, it can be viewed as guidance as well and each insurer
has forms and specific definitions of financial information to be reported.
The institutional purchasing platform includes suitability review as part
of the purchase process, and a checklist is used for a systematic approach.
Examples of flags that would prompt further review, and in some cases, a
confirmation contact with the applicant for the annuity include: relatively
large annuity purchase compared to assets, a single life annuity without
refund or a certain period, a purchaser over age 80 or younger than age
59.5, and insufficient financial information on the suitability form. After
the reviewer looks at the financial situation and reasons for purchase, there
may be a follow-up contact if required.7 The suitability review process serves
to confirm that the buyer understands their purchase decision and that the
sale is appropriate. An interview with a reviewer indicates that buyers rarely
change their minds as part of the suitability process.
Experience with guidance models
Many facilitators are salaried employees of program partners, and Hueler
has licensed employees who can answer questions for purchasers, partner
employees, or advisors. In some situations, the facilitators initiate the
process of securing a bid, and make a purchase; in others, they simply
answer questions. Experience has shown that the conversation is a very
important element in influencing purchase activity. Thus, 72 percent of the
purchases in our analysis occurred via facilitators and advisors; the
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remaining 28 percent of the purchases occurred online, but here too, some
people also ask questions after contacting their program partner’s help
center. Very few individuals buy an annuity without a conversation—prob-
ably fewer than 10 percent of purchasers—and many people request mul-
tiple bids and multiple purchases.
In the past, the decision about whether to purchase lifetime income
annuities in an employer-sponsored arrangement assumed purchase would
occur just when the employee was retiring, and it was presented as an all-or-
nothing decision. Yet this approach does not conform well to peoples’
preferred decision-making approach. In our experience, 70 percent of the
annuity purchases were made by individuals who identify themselves as
already retired. People prefer to make annuity purchases over a longer
time period, since moving into retirement can require a period of transition
and adjustment. Some need time to see howmuch they will be spending and
how much more regular income they need; others seek to work part-time
and it may take time to see how this affects their needs. Others change their
living arrangements and housing. It also makes sense to phase purchases
over time in order to diversify interest rate risk. As a consequence, offering
an immediate annuity purchase as an irrevocable decision and an all-or-
nothing option is likely to be rejected. The institutional choice platform is
one alternative for moving away from the old unsuccessful delivery model.8
Immediate annuity buyers
An analysis of purchases drawn from the Hueler platform database indicates
that about two-thirds of the immediate annuity buyers are men. The most
common age for purchase is in the 60s (56 percent) but some purchasers are
as young as age 50 and others as old as 85. Thirty-two percent are aged 70+,
including 8 percent who are aged 80+. Seven percent of the immediate
annuity purchasers reporting their net worth on the coded sample of suit-
ability forms indicated having a net worth of under $100,000; 27 percent
indicated net worth of $500,000–$1,000,000; 21 percent had $1,000,000–
$2,000,000; and 14 percent said they had over $2,000,000. While financial
profile questions vary, they do not include home equity, and wealth data
are self-reported. Sixty-eight percent of the purchases are from tax-qualified
assets,9 either IRAs or DC plans; 28 percent are from non-qualified
assets; and 4 percent are exchanges under Section 1035 of the Internal
Revenue Code.10 Exchanges are existing annuity contracts—often variable
annuities—that are exchanged for immediate annuities purchased through
this platform. Some purchasers use a combination of qualified and non-
qualified funds to purchase multiple annuities.
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Table 7.5 provides a closer look at annuity purchases. Structural guidance
included in the system provides that in addition to the requested quote, at
least one alternative quote is presented. Many immediate annuity buyers (50
percent) purchase single life annuities; another third (37 percent) buy joint
life annuities; and 13 percent buy period certain annuities. Only 14 percent
of those buying immediate annuities purchase products with inflation
protection, either consumer price index (CPI)-linked or annual percentage
increases. We also see that men and women select different types of annu-
ities: 81 percent of the joint life annuities are purchased by males, compared
to only 50 percent of the single life annuities. It is likely that in married
couples, the husband would be designated as the purchaser more often than
the wife.
While the amount of income purchased averages over $850 per month,
many purchases are for smaller amounts: 11 percent bought less than $200
monthly; 18 percent bought $200–$399 per month; and 22 percent $400–
$599. Fifty percent purchased less than $600 per month, 22 percent from
$600 to $999, and 28 percent more than $1,000 in monthly income.
Women purchased lower amounts, averaging $110,000 of premium versus
$156,000 for males. While the vast majority of buyers make a single pur-
chase at a time, some do make multiple purchases (however, the purchase
Table 7.5 Characteristics of single premium immediate annuities purchased:
amounts of income purchased and annuity features chosen
Type of annuity Percentage
of total
purchases
(%)
Average
monthly
income
purchased
($)
Percentage
of total
purchases
with inflation
protection or
fixed annual
increases (%)
Percentage
purchased
by male
buyers (%)
Percentage
purchased
by female
buyers (%)
Joint life
With cash refund 7 900 10 78 22
Life only 14 973 8 75 25
With term certain 17 799 23 87 13
Total joint life 37 81 19
Single life
With cash refund 9 789 10 53 47
Life only 28 803 18 51 49
With term certain 13 843 13 45 55
Total single life 50 50 50
Fixed period only 13 1,032 3 65 35
Total of all
contracts
100 14 63 37
Source: Authors’ analysis of data provided by the Hueler Companies.
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data shown here are based on single purchases; multiple purchases are not
aggregated).
Timeline from quotes to purchase
Whereas a DB plan election must be made within a specified time window
and the price of various options is part of the DB plan design, the annuity
purchase process is very different when individuals utilize the institutional
platform.11 The buyer can choose when to purchase, what to buy, and can
make the decision over a long period of time. People can buy annuities
with different features and monthly income benefits, and they can obtain
multiple contracts. In our experience, many buyers secure multiple quotes;
though 78 percent of purchases are completed within four weeks of the
initial quotation, some people take as long as two years to move from the
initial quote to purchase.
Competition, issuer selection, and fee disclosure
considerations
On the institutional platform, competitive bidding is used for all annuity
quotations. Experience reviewing quote data shows that, at any given point
in time, different individual issuers will be competitive for different quota-
tion scenarios, and quote results also change over time. Differentials
between results for individual quotation scenarios may be due to insurance
carrier views of specific annuity features, demographics, underlying pricing
assumptions, market conditions, and timing.
Our analysis of several thousand annuity quotes indicates that, on aver-
age, the difference in monthly income between the high and low quote
averages 8 percent; in some instances, it may be as much as 20 percent
though spreads greater than 15 percent are rare. Our analysis also exam-
ined individual issuers’ positions on annuity quotes relative to peer
companies, illustrated in Figure 7.1. Here we report a sample of fifty
individual quotations, each with a $100,000 annuity purchase price; one
specific insurance carrier’s quote position is plotted against multiple peer
companies across different annuity types over a twelve-month period. Each
vertical line in the figure represents the range of the high to low annuity
quotes across the various providers for each annuity quotation scenario.
The box represents the same individual insurance carrier across each quote
scenario. In the period shown, this carrier had the high result for some
quotes and the low result for others; it was in the middle range for the
remaining cases. Similar results have been found consistently over time.
The size of the spread between the high and low quote varied by scenario.
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To put results in context, the spreads are not as large as those found in the
United Kingdom (Reyes and Stewart, 2008).
Handling questions and concerns
Some program partners have support staff to answer questions and assist
with the purchase process, while others directly approach Hueler Com-
panies staff. Some common questions are about process: How to access the
live quotes and what happens during the quote/purchase process?
Another common question is ‘How much should I annuitize?’ Individuals
who ask this question are directed to the ‘income gap’ calculator at the
website that helps them consider other sources of income and categories of
typical expenses, and the difference between essential and discretionary
expenses is also explained. Another common question is whether there are
any fees involved in the program. The institutional platform embeds a flat
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Figure 7.1 Annuity quotes for a $100,000 deposit over one year
Source: Authors’ analysis of data provide by the Hueler Companies.
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one-time transaction fee in quotes for all purchases. Fees are fully disclosed
to the individuals before and after purchase, which may generate add-
itional questions (as this differs from other annuity delivery models).
Buyers also often ask questions about providing survivor benefits and
inflation protection.
Other commonly asked questions are about insurance companies and
include how many insurance companies are available to choose from. This
number can be as many as ten, depending on the annuity features
requested and the program partners to which they are linked. Buyers also
commonly ask how insurance companies are chosen and what the differ-
ences are between companies. They are directed to the location on the
website that provides information about the companies used and their
financial conditions, including ratings from Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s,
and A. M. Best. Some annuity buyers as well as program partners are very
aware of the issue of insurer insolvency and ask about this issue. Some
buyers split the purchase between multiple insurance carriers to diversify
insurance carrier risk. Plan sponsors who offer access to any form of
annuity product or platform whether or not it includes competitive bidding
are generally concerned about appropriate oversight with regard to the
financial stability of any participating insurance company.
International comparisons
To illustrate two alternative approaches to the purchase of annuities by
older individuals, we next discuss briefly the experiences of Chile and the
United Kingdom.
The Chilean experience
Chile has had a national mandatory DC pension system since 1981, and
retirees have the choice of taking ‘programmed’ or phased withdrawals, or
buying an annuity. Workers’ assets are accumulated in private pension
funds, Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones (AFPs), which also pro-
vide the programmed withdrawals; workers may not take lump sums from
these accounts. Insurers compete to provide quotes for annuities, and
persons whose accounts are less than the amount needed to provide the
minimum benefit guarantee cannot purchase annuities. Currently, most
Chilean retirees have elected annuity payments (Ruiz and Mitchell, 2012).
To address concerns about the cost and expenses of annuities, a govern-
ment-sponsored competitive bidding computer-based system named
SCOMP was introduced in 2004 to improve competitiveness and transpar-
ency, and to better meet participant needs. SCOMP annuity quotations can
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be solicited directly by individuals, or an insurance broker can generate
these on the retiree’s behalf. If an individual purchases an annuity directly
via the computer there is no intermediation fee; if a broker is used, an
intermediation fee of up to 2.5 percent can be charged (Reyes and Stewart,
2008). Members can request up to three quotes with or without the assist-
ance of brokers or sales agents, from all competing insurers. Upon receipt,
the member can accept one of the quotes, request additional offers, or
rebid the account.
The Chilean system differs from the institutional platform described
above in that it is connected to a mandatory government DC program. By
contrast, our institutional platform is linked to a number of pension
entities but it is up to plan participants to seek quotes. Once a quote is
requested, competitive information is automatically provided for all car-
riers participating in the program. Moreover, in our institutional platform,
there is a fully disclosed one-time transaction fee determined by the service
level and program partner, and no further intermediation fees or commis-
sions are paid. Where an advisor is used, the one-time transaction fee is
typically the lowest fee available, because the individual then pays the
advisor an out-of-pocket fee; the advisor is hired by and represents the
individual.
In Chile, although 34 percent of the participants who enter the system do
so directly via the Internet, only 12 percent finalize the process without
paying a commission. In addition, only a small fraction of the participants
use the option to secure a competitive bid (Reyes and Stewart, 2008).
Therefore, in Chile and in the Income Solutions® platform, most partici-
pants seek and use active guidance and support. With the institutional
platform, competitive bidding is automatic, but in Chile it is not, and its
use is limited.
The experience in Chile also demonstrates that incentives matter. Where
brokers were involved in the process of reviewing annuities, 75 percent of
the individuals got the best (highest) payout. Only 43 percent did so when
the retirees used the AFP for advice, and only 3 percent when a life insurer
was consulted, perhaps because brokers had an incentive to capture cus-
tomers once contacted. The AFPs participate actively during the accumu-
lation phase but receive no payments for giving advice about payout
products (Ruiz and Mitchell, 2012).
Lessons from the United Kingdom
In the past it was possible for retirees to take one-quarter of their accumu-
lated pension wealth as a lump sum, whether from a DB or DC plan; the
balance had to be annuitized by age 75. Individuals have had the right to
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shop around for an annuity through the Open Market Option (OMO)
since 1978, but the majority still used their pension provider to supply their
annuity despite the fact that they did not necessarily receive the best
annuity rate. Indeed, the difference in income between the best OMO
rate and the participant’s existing pension provider could be as much as
30 percent, but only about one in three individuals switched to a new
provider (Reyes and Stewart, 2008). Starting in 2002, pensioners had to
be informed that they had the right to secure annuities from organizations
other than their current pension providers, and those with higher incomes
were more likely to switch. Twenty-six percent of people with monthly
income from £250 to £499 went to the OMO, versus 67 percent of those
with monthly incomes over £3800 (Reyes and Stewart, 2008).
The UK government has been working to improve the process with the
Pensions Advisory Service, an independent voluntary organization that
offers a Pensions Advisory Service (TPAS) online annuity planner. This
planner assists individuals in selecting annuities and understanding prices.
The planner and various information booklets are part of a larger Money
Advice Service, a website organized by the government and financed by a
levy on the financial services industry. The planner discusses issues such as
single life versus joint, survivor income, inflation protection, and death
benefits, thus providing a type of structural guidance (Reyes and Stewart,
2008; Money Advice Service, 2012).
Observations
While Chile and the United Kingdom focus heavily on lifetime income, in
the United States program architecture is the main way that plan sponsors
drive enrollment, saving, and investment choices. Of course, the United
States differs from these other countries by providing significant inflation-
adjusted monthly income from the national Social Security system, while
the United Kingdom and Chile have mandatory DC plans.
Another factor worth highlighting is the role of competitive bidding. As
shown by Hackethal and Inderst (2013), research on the effectiveness of
financial advice calls for greater transparency with regard to outcomes, and
supports the value of competitive bidding. As we have noted above, when
bids are compared over a period of time, who offers the best bid varies over
time and by quote scenario. Without a process to facilitate private-sector
competition, people tend to remain with their existing providers even if
they could substantially improve their monthly income amount and ultim-
ate income sufficiency. Moreover, since many purchasers want multiple
quotes before completing a purchase, having the product comparisons
available on the Internet is useful. Nevertheless, a lifetime income product
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purchase decision is complex, so for most people it requires additional
support or guidance.
Another factor is that most of the US annuity buyers (61 percent in our
data) on our platform use one-quarter of their financial wealth or less when
they annuitize. Thus, buyers appear to be thinking about the purchase as
part of a portfolio, implying that the all-or-nothing traditional approach is
unlikely to attract many buyers. In Chile, by contrast, people annuitize
more because there is a much smaller safety net, compared to the United
States. In other words, the commonly accepted belief that annuities are not
an attractive way to provide plan distributions is probably flawed, since
this conclusion does not recognize the significant deterrents that poor
framing, constrained delivery, and lack of guidance often place in the
way of annuitization.
Conclusion
Guaranteed lifetime income is an important part of retirement security,
but in the United States, Social Security does not provide a sufficient single
source of lifetime income for many retirees. When a retirement plan does
not provide lifetime income, steps can be taken to boost guaranteed
retirement income flows. The institutional purchasing platform described
here offers a real-world model that brings together transparency, competi-
tion, and guidance in the annuity purchasing process. Structural guidance
is a critical component to a system that works well, but it is insufficient: also
needed are personal conversations to enhance the chances that people will
annuitize a portion of their assets.
Taking advantage of institutional purchasing and structural guidance,
the benefits of group pricing and an informed purchasing process can be
provided to individuals served by plan sponsors, administrators, advisors,
and financial services organizations. Purchasers are more comfortable and
more likely to buy when they have active guidance; that is, someone with
whom they can discuss the purchase decision and who can help them
understand the relevant issues. Competitive pricing can yield higher monthly
income amounts.
While annuitization of retirement assets may not suit everyone, it is
important to have access to a fair presentation of payout options which
include annuities. Further work is needed to better understand the
choices made about managing resources in retirement, the barriers to
considering guaranteed lifetime income, the influence of key parties,
and the policies and programs that help individuals make the best
decisions. Moreover, annuities often receive bad press related to their
costs, complicated features, and provider risk. Unfortunately, immediate
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annuities offering lifetime income are often confused with more com-
plex investment-focused variable annuity products. Another barrier is
that financial advice sometimes emanates from sources whose revenue
would be reduced if their advisees were to annuitize. In addition, some
employers who do seek better financial outcomes for their retirees are
still reluctant to get involved in the post-retirement period, due to
concerns about fiduciary and legal liability. Further research is needed
to determine where conflicts of interest or mixed messages impede
actions that are in the best interests of participants with regard to
lifetime income.
Appendix: Eight case studies
Case studies and analysis of purchases help explain what happens in the
purchase process, based on our experience with the institutional platform.
Buyer A offers an example of a sophisticated purchaser. Buyer A was a
female working with a financial advisor, who bought twelve separate annu-
ity contracts, four per year for three consecutive years. Multiple carriers
were used, diversifying carrier risk. The transactions were executed by the
advisor and the quotes secured by the advisor. These were single life
annuities, with inflation indexing in most and some variation in the fea-
tures. Funds were withdrawn from an IRA and the amount of the premium
paid per purchase ($10,000) was the same. Purchasing over time diversifies
interest rate risk and allowed the buyer to get accustomed to the annuity.
The buyer was at the age of 66 in the first year, and she purchased a total of
$575 per month in additional income. Twenty-two competitive price quotes
were secured during the process.
Buyer B, a male aged 62 and the joint annuitant a female aged 59, offers
another example of a sophisticated purchasing strategy. This purchaser
bought from three different insurance carriers at a single point in time,
paying a premium of $50,000 per carrier for a purchase of $904 of monthly
income. All purchases were from qualified plan funds from a DC plan with
the same plan design for each: joint life with 50 percent benefit to the
survivor and a ten-year certain benefit. Four quotes were requested within a
six-month period from the date of first quote to the purchase date.
Buyer C, a couple, bought five annuity contracts using multiple carriers
with a mix of qualified and non-qualified funds; they also bought both
single life and joint life policies with a cash refund. Fewer than three weeks
transpired from the initial quote to the purchase date, and fifty-one quotes
were secured for many different annuity feature combinations.
Buyer D was a retiree aged 85, with a 67-year-old joint annuitant. He
bought two contracts about five months apart. His first purchase was
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made with the help of a facilitator who requested the quote and executed
the purchase. The second was made by the individual. Two different
insurance carriers were used. The first purchase was for a joint annuity
with 100 percent to the survivor and a term certain, and the second for a
single life with term certain. Four quotes were secured and the first pur-
chase was made the same week as the first quote. The premium was
$250,000 for the first purchase and $175,000 for the second; the income
stream purchased was $1,481 per month in the first purchase and $1,516 in
the second.
Buyer E bought a five-year term certain annuity; he was a 61-year-old male
using $70,000 of qualified plan funds to purchase $1,200 of monthly
income. Nine quotes were obtained and four months passed from the
first quote to the purchase. Possible reasons for the purchase of a five-
year term certain annuity include a bridge to social security benefits, a
desire to defer social security claiming, financing of college expenses, or
providing more income to pay off a mortgage.
Buyer F was an 84-year-old female who used $150,000 to purchase $1,653
of monthly lifetime income using non-qualified funds; no refund features
were purchased. A facilitator aided in the purchase. Eight quotations were
secured, and it took five weeks from the first quotation to the purchase.
Purchases by annuitants in their 80s are typically supported by facilitators,
often use non-qualified assets, and receive additional scrutiny relative to
suitability.
Buyer G was a male aged 65 and female aged 64 who made four purchases
using four insurance carriers. A three-week period passed from first quote
to final purchase, and thirty quotes were secured involving various combin-
ations of annuity features including a mix of joint life with 100 percent
survivor income and single life income; term certain periods of fifteen to
twenty years were included. Purchases were made from qualified plan funds,
and a facilitator secured the quotes. Total purchase price was more than
$500,000 which amounted to less than a third of total liquid net worth. The
individual diversified carrier risk by selecting different insurers.
Buyer H was a member of a couple where the wife was much younger:
the husband was aged 66 at the time of the first purchase, and the wife
was aged 46. The couple made purchases a year apart and bought six
contracts, with a premium of $35,000 per contract; they elected a joint
and 100 percent survivor benefit with inflation indexing. IRA funds were
used, and two weeks elapsed between the time of the first quote and the
first purchase. A total of nine quotes were secured and there was an
advisor involved.
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Endnotes
1. Advisors are individuals providing financial advice to clients. Advice providers
are firms that provide advice to employee benefit plan sponsors and adminis-
trators, often using an automated platform. Their programs may include call
centers and individuals who have conversations with users.
2. Advanced life deferred annuities are annuity contracts that provide for deferral
to some advanced age, such as 85, with no death benefit if death occurs earlier.
They provide a way to insure the longevity risk starting at the advanced age at
moderate cost. Until now, the tax regulations were a barrier to use this type of
annuity in tax-deferred retirement funds.
3. A rollover provision allows an amount for a DC plan to be transferred to a DB
plan and lifetime income is then provided by the DB plan. In effect, the retiree is
buying the annuity from the DB plan.
4. In addition, IRA balances may later be used to purchase individual annuities, but
this information is not tracked so we cannot determine how many DC account
balances are ultimately converted to annuities (Wray, 2008).
5. The projection could be for any form of structured income in retirement and
need not be for lifetime income.
6. Relatively few advisors have taken this route to date; 75 percent of financial
planners said they always or frequently advocate systematic withdrawals
for income generation, 38 percent always or frequently advocate the time-
segmentation approach, and 33 percent of planners always or frequently
advocate the essential versus discretionary approach (Guyton, 2011).
7. As an example of a response to a review question from a facilitator, we have the
following: ‘The buyer has confirmed that he has sufficient funds to cover basic
and emergency expenses and that he is not using more than 50 percent of his
stated net worth to purchase the annuity.’ Examples of review questions that life-
only buyers are asked to confirm might be that they understand that there is no
benefit beyond their lifetime, and those who buy period certain annuities are
asked to confirm that there is no benefit beyond the certain period.
8. Trial annuitization is another example of an alternative model designed to
address some of these inherent drawbacks. Advocates of lifetime income alterna-
tives have proposed the concept of trial annuitization, where assets might be
annuitized for an initial fixed period; after that, the individual would have a
choice to convert to a lifetime annuity or to take some other approach, including
receiving a lump sum.
9. Qualified funds are funds in tax-preferred retirement savings accounts such as
IRAs and 401(k) plans. The Internal Revenue Code sets limits on how much can
be contributed to these funds, and how funds must be withdrawn. The tax
treatment of annuities is different when purchased with qualified funds and
non-qualified funds.
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10. Under US tax law, Section 1035 of the Internal Revenue Code, holders of
annuity contracts are allowed to exchange them for other annuity contracts
without paying tax at the time of transfer.
11. For an illustrative set of case studies, see the Appendix.
References
Callan Investments Institute (2012). 2012 Defined Contribution Trends Survey. San
Francisco, CA: Callan Associates.
Council of Economic Advisers (2012). ‘Supporting Retirement for American
Families.’ Washington, DC: CEA. February 2 <http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/
default/files/cea_retirement_report_01312012_final.pdf>.
Guyton, J. (2011). ‘Special Report: Retirement Income Planning: Study Suggests
Link Between Planner Retirement Advice and Client Life Style Changes,’ Journal
of Financial Planning, 24(12): 28–32.
Hackethal, A., and R. Inderst (2013). ‘How to Make the Market for Financial Advice
Work,’ in O. S. Mitchell and K. Smetters, eds., The Market for Retirement Financial
Advice. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, pp. 213–28.
Hueler, K. (2012). ‘PSCA Adds Hueler Income Solutions® as a Member Benefit,’
Defined Contribution Insights, 60(1): 17.
Institutional Retirement Income Council (2011). Types of Institutional Retirement
Income Products. Iselin, NJ: Institutional Retirement Income Council. http://
www.iricouncil.org/types
Iwry, J. Mark, and J. A. Turner (2009). Automatic Annuitization: New Behavioral
Strategies for Expanding Lifetime Income in 401(k)s. Washington, DC: Retirement
Security Project. http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2009/
07_annuitization_iwry/07_annuitization_iwry.pdf
Money Advice Service (2012). Pensions and Retirement. London, UK: Money Advice
Service. https://www.moneyadviceservice.org.uk/en/categories/pensions-and-
retirement
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) (2010). Revised Suitability
in Annuity Transactions Model Regulation Executive Summary. Kansas City, MO: NAIC.
http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_a_suitability_reg_guidance.pdf
Rappaport, A. M. (2011). ‘Retirement Security in the New Economy, Developing
New Paradigms for the Payout Period,’ in Society of Actuaries, eds. Retirement
Security in the New Economy: Paradigm Shifts, New Approaches and Holistic Strategies.
Schaumburg, IL: Society of Actuaries. http://www.soa.org/library/monographs/
retirement-systems/retirement-security/mono-2011-mrs12-rappaport-paper.aspx
Reyes, G., and F. Stewart (2008). ‘Transparency and Competition in the Choice of
Pension Products: The Chilean and UK Experience,’ Working Paper No. 7. Paris,
France: International Organization of Pension Supervisors (OIPS).
Ruiz, J., and O. S. Mitchell (2012). ‘Pension Payouts in Chile: Past, Present, and
Future Prospects,’ in O. S. Mitchell, J. Piggott, and N. Takayama, eds., Securing
Lifelong Retirement Income: Global Annuity Markets and Policy. Oxford, UK: Oxford
University Press, pp. 106–30.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 17/9/2013, SPi
148 The Market for Retirement Financial Advice
Turner, J. A., and D. M. Muir (2013). ‘The Market for Financial Advisers,’ in
O. S. Mitchell and K. Smetters, eds., The Market for Retirement Financial Advice.
Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, pp. 13–45.
United States Department of the Treasury (2012). Treasury Fact Sheet: Helping Ameri-
can Families Achieve Retirement Security by Expanding Lifetime Income Choices. Wash-
ington, DC: US GPO. http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/
Documents/020212%20Retirement%20Security%20Factsheet.pdf
United States Senate (2011). Background on the Lifetime Income Disclosure Act (S.267).
Washington, DC: US GPO. http://bingaman.senate.gov/upload/Lifetime_
Disclosure_Act.pdf
Wray, D. (2008). Testimony before the ERISA Advisory Council Working Group Working
Group on Spend Down of Defined Contribution Assets at Retirement. Washington, DC:
ERISA Advisory Council, US Department of Labor.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 17/9/2013, SPi
The Role of Guidance in the Annuity Decision-Making Process 149
